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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the key new discretionary features of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) after the Agenda 2000 reforms.  These include the possibilities for reallocating a 
proportion of farmers' direct payments and the implementation of the Rural Development 
Regulation, hailed by the European Commission as the new ‘second pillar’ to the CAP.  The 
paper compares and contrasts the ways in which Britain and France are taking a lead in using 
these features, according to their distinctive national agricultural agendas and rural priorities, 
and considers the implications for the future development of European policy.  
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Introduction 
 
The Berlin Summit in March 1999 saw the conclusion of the most recent phase of reform to 
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The agreed changes continue in the direction 
of adjusting agricultural prices towards world market levels and increasing the direct 
payments to European producers in compensation.  However, a significant degree of Member 
State discretion has also been introduced in the deployment of some direct payments.  Some 
governments  most notably Britain and France  are using this discretion to position 
themselves and to set a direction for the next round of CAP reform. 
 
Since the 1980s, two alternative visions have competed for influence in determining the 
evolution of the CAP.  On the one hand, ‘market liberalisers’ have pressed for reductions in 
commodity prices, and the removal of export aids to open up the European agricultural market 
to world trade.  On the other hand, the ‘protectionists’ have argued that such moves would be 
detrimental to farming communities across the European Union and have resisted calls for 
further CAP reforms.  Between these two positions, a ‘third way’ has emerged, centred upon 
what is claimed to be a particular and unique European model of agriculture whose defining 
feature is held to be its ‘multi–functionality’.  The concept implies that agriculture produces 
benefits and services other than food commodities.  These include the generation and 
management of rural landscapes and ecological features, as well as the social role of 
supporting populations in peripheral areas.  The challenge for the EU, therefore, has been to 
engage in wider processes of agricultural trade liberalisation while, at the same time, 
developing an agricultural and rural policy that recognises and accommodates agriculture’s 
multi–functional role.  To this end, the Berlin Summit agreement could only serve as one step 
in a more protracted process of reform.  Critical to the pace of evolutionary change, however, 
are the unprecedented opportunities that have been opened up for individual Member States to 
tailor the CAP to meet national priorities and circumstances.   
 
This paper examines key discretionary features of the post–1999 CAP, most notably the 
possibilities for reallocating a proportion of farmers’ direct payments and the implementation 
of the Rural Development Regulation, hailed by the European Commission as the new 
‘second pillar’ to the CAP.  It compares and contrasts the ways in which Britain and France 
are taking a lead in using these features, according to their distinctive national agricultural 
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agendas and rural priorities, and considers the implications for the future development of 
European policy. 
 
The Background to the Agenda 2000 Reforms 
 
Agriculture has always been the EU’s largest policy area in budgetary terms.  The CAP has 
been the subject of incremental reforms since the mid–1980s, initially in response to political 
and budgetary pressures arising from food surpluses and the costs of storing and disposing of 
them (Groenendijk, 1993). Various measures were taken to curb production growth and to 
contain the agricultural budget, with varying degrees of success.  Milk quotas were agreed in 
1984, followed by the agreement of agricultural budgetary guidelines in 1988.  Subsequently, 
in response to growing international pressures for the liberalisation of agricultural trade within 
the Uruguay round of the GATT world trade talks, a wider package  the so-called 
MacSharry reforms, under Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry  was agreed by the 
EU in 1992 (Kay, 1998). These included a marked reduction in support prices for grains, 
oilseeds and beef in order to bring EU prices closer to world market prices; quasi-compulsory 
set-aside to reduce the over-production of arable crops; direct payments to arable and beef 
farmers to compensate for price cuts; and a set of ‘accompanying measures’ (to promote agri-
environment, agro-forestry and early retirement programmes). 
 
In 1995, Franz Fischler, MacSharry’s successor, reopened debate on CAP reform in an 
agricultural strategy paper (CEC, 1995).  Fischler recognised that the balance of forces pulling 
on the CAP was shifting making it difficult to defend the post-MacSharry status quo.  The 
prospect of EU enlargement to the east, to include countries with sizeable agricultural sectors 
with many social and economic difficulties, raised the issue of how the CAP would need to be 
adapted to meet this challenge.  There was also anticipation of the pressures for more trade 
liberalisation with the start of the next round of world trade talks due in 1999.  Fischler took 
the opportunity to place other challenges to the CAP on the agenda as well, including the need 
to diversify rural economies, the shortcomings of the EU's regional funds and the obligation 
in the Maastricht Treaty to integrate environmental concerns into other EU policies.  
Rejecting both the continuation of the status quo and ‘radical’ liberalisation of the CAP, the 
paper advocated taking forward the spirit of the 1992 reforms, of cuts in market support offset 
in part by direct and decoupled payments to farmers, with a stronger emphasis on the 
integration of social and environmental policy aims. 
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A group of experts, chaired by the British agricultural economist Allan Buckwell, was 
charged by the Agricultural Directorate of the European Commission to outline the principles 
that might guide future CAP reform (Buckwell et al., 1997).  The Buckwell Group mapped 
out a series of step–wise transitions whereby the CAP could be transformed into an integrated 
rural policy over the medium term.  This would involve the progressive liberalisation of the 
various commodity market organisations, entailing the payment of time–limited compensation 
to producers affected by price cuts.  The MacSharry reforms initiated this process, converting 
some of the indirect costs of supporting protected and managed markets into direct subsidies 
to farmers.  However, the Buckwell Group saw those changes as only the first step in the 
transformation of the CAP.  Subsequent steps should involve not only the dismantling of the 
panoply of supply controls and the decoupling of compensation payments from production 
but also steady reductions in these payments (referred to as ‘degressivity’) and the switch of 
public resources to support both the environmental management functions of agriculture and 
the socio–economic development of rural areas. 
 
In November 1996, Fischler convened a conference on rural development at Cork in an 
attempt to engender some broader support for his ideas on reform (Lowe et al., 1996).  The 
declaration from the Conference pointed towards a much-expanded rural development 
programme to embrace the whole farmed countryside.  It was argued that many of the existing 
funds and schemes should be brought together, to simplify the plethora of policy mechanisms.  
Subsidiarity was seen as an important mechanism in achieving the objective of an integrated 
rural policy, with an emphasis on regional programming, greater transparency and bottom–up 
participation. 
 
The timing of the Conference though was not propitious.  Farming unions and most 
agricultural ministries had little enthusiasm for reopening CAP reform, and the gathering BSE 
crisis was also fostering a mood of political retrenchment.  In these circumstances, the 
ambitious nature of the Cork Declaration itself generated a political reaction from farming 
leaders and ministers who feared that rural policy would be promoted at the expense of 
support for agriculture.  The declaration was thus not endorsed by the Council of Agricultural 
Ministers and was sidelined by the Dublin EU summit in December 1996.  To rescue his now 
floundering strategy and to allay the opposition of agricultural ministries, Fischler then sought 
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to detach the promotion of rural policy from the question of CAP reform: the two, he argued, 
should proceed in parallel but separately. 
The Commission’s draft Agenda 2000 proposals were issued in July 1997.  They linked 
together proposals for changes in agricultural policy and the Structural Funds with the plans 
for the enlargement of the EU and the framework for the medium–term budget for the Union.  
In agriculture, the Commission’s intention was largely to continue the reforms initiated in 
1992 by further reducing price support towards world prices, extending the reforms to include 
dairying as well as the arable and beef regimes, moving away from certain supply controls 
and increasing direct compensation payments for farmers.  However, stress was also laid on 
the role of farmers in maintaining the countryside.  It was suggested that the agri–environment 
Regulation be reinforced and better funded to give it a prominent role in supporting 
sustainable development in rural areas and meeting society’s environmental demands.  The 
possibility was also raised of transforming Less Favoured Areas (LFA) policy into a basic 
instrument to maintain and promote low output farming systems.  The most radical proposal 
was to combine these two measures  the agri–environment Regulation and LFA policy  
with rural development measures, to create a new instrument (the Rural Development 
Regulation) to support integrated agricultural and rural development across the whole EU.  
This Regulation, it was proposed, would be financed under the Guarantee section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) but would be implemented in 
a decentralised way, at the initiative of Member States.  The proposal therefore took forward 
the idea, trailed by the Commission at the Cork Conference, of the promotion of a sustainable 
rural policy within the CAP through a flexible and programmed approach that would be 
responsive to the diversity of rural needs and environmental circumstances across the EU.  In 
keeping with this new approach to rural policy, Agenda 2000 proposed that established 
regional supports for poorer rural regions (most notably Objective 5b of the Structural Funds) 
should be concentrated onto a smaller geographical area. 
 
In key respects, therefore, the Commission’s Agenda 2000 proposals did set out the basic 
parameters that could guide the transition from the CAP to an Integrated Rural Policy.  
However, the Commission did not bite the bullet of proposing that compensation payments to 
farmers should be phased out eventually.  Undoubtedly, the negative reaction of several 
Member States to the Cork Conference had signalled strong political resistance to any move 
that could be seen as taking money away from farmers.  The Commission was therefore 
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constrained in the proposals it could feasibly bring forward.  As a result, the Agenda 2000 
proposals did not establish the critical resourcing linkage that the Buckwell Group envisaged 
whereby a steady reduction in production subsidies could be used to fund the build–up of 
alternative rural policy supports.  The medium–term resourcing of the integrated rural 
development instrument was thus left unclear which meant that references to it becoming “the 
second pillar of the CAP” (CEC, 1998, para. 2.4) seemed little more than wishful thinking.  
The prospect was thus of only limited additional funding for rural supports (including agri–
environmental measures) but a major expansion of compensation payments to farmers.  With 
no indication that these payments would not be indefinite, the Commission had to concede the 
extension of the existing option of placing environmental conditions on livestock payments, to 
include arable and set-aside payments too. 
 
From 1997 to 1999 there were intense negotiations over the Agenda 2000 proposals between 
the European  Commission  and  the  Member States.  As well as the divide between 
liberalising and protectionist positions and the pursuit of disparate national agricultural 
interests, CAP reform also got caught up in a growing debate over the EU’s future budget.  
Prospective new demands on the budget arising from EU enlargement were met by calls to 
restrict the growth of the budget and to rebalance the financial burden between Member 
States.  With the CAP accounting for about half of the EU’s budget, it could not be insulated 
from this debate.  Indeed, one of the main pressures to reform the CAP came from recognition 
that it would be extremely expensive to extend the existing CAP to the accession countries.  
The Commission’s own proposals involved an increase in expenditure to compensate farmers 
for reduced support but with spending stabilising from 2004 onwards.  In order to reach 
agreement, as the negotiations with Agriculture Ministers proceeded, the Commission had to 
make various concessions to its original proposals, thereby increasing the cost further.  This 
aroused growing impatience from Finance Ministers and Heads of Government who 
eventually ruled that there should be no overall increase in the agricultural budget, a decision 
which severely constrained the room for manoeuvre in pushing forward CAP reform. 
 
The negotiations over CAP reform were concluded in March 1999 by Heads of Government 
meeting in Berlin.  The Summit made a number of changes to an agreement reached by the 
Agriculture Council a few weeks earlier.  These were mainly to reduce the projected 
expenditure on the CAP and included restrictive limits on the amount of money that could be 
spent on rural development and the environment.  The main CAP budget was limited to Euro 
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40.5 billion per annum.  However, Heads of Government disagreed as to how this should be 
achieved. Farm Ministers had accepted that, in principle, degressivity did offer a way forward, 
and the Commission had tabled its own proposals which for the very first time anticipated the 
reduction in direct payments (Agra Europe, 12 February 1999, A/1-3).  However, it proved 
difficult to agree on a model of degressivity acceptable to all Member States. This was largely 
because the different models would have had a differential impact on each state’s farming 
structure and therefore on national shares of the CAP budget.  In addition, a few states, 
including Germany, remained opposed to the very idea.  In the final conclusions, and at the 
initiative of the French President, it was decided instead to cut expenditure through the 
expediency of postponing reform of the dairy regime, scaling back price cuts for cereals and 
retaining set–aside.  
 
The Agenda 2000 outcome was thus deeply compromised and must be judged a missed 
opportunity to transform the CAP (Tangermann, 1999; Lowe and Brouwer, 2000). The most 
disappointing aspect from the point of view of those seeking a progressive middle way 
between the liberalisers and the protectionists was that there was no ‘reform dividend’ at the 
EU level (i.e. a freeing up of funds from production subsidies to be available to promote the 
integrated rural development agenda).  However, while EU-wide progress seemed 
deadlocked, crucial elements of national discretion were incorporated into Agenda 2000 
which not only allow greater adaptation of the CAP to national and regional circumstances 
but also open up a significant policy margin in which Member States, if they choose, can push 
forward reform and test out new approaches (see Figure 1).  In effect, this opens up the 
prospect of piecemeal reform ‘from below’. 
 
The Second Pillar and Modulation 
 
From the perspective of transforming the CAP from a sectoral policy of farm commodity 
support into an integrated policy for rural development and environmental enhancement, the 
most significant feature of the Agenda 2000 reforms is the Rural Development Regulation 
(1257/99).  In terms of its substantive scope, the RDR strikes an uneasy balance between 
continuity and change.  Although a novel departure, it incorporates several existing CAP 
measures, including: structural adjustment of the farming sector; support for farming in Less 
Favoured Areas; remuneration for agri–environmental activities; support for investments in 
processing and marketing; and forestry measures.  Indeed, all but one of the sets of measures 
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are not new at all.  The distinctly new set of measures is that for promoting “the adaptation 
and development of rural areas” (Article 33, see Figure 2). This extends both the scope of, and 
the eligibility for, CAP supports to make them of wider benefit, including the prospect of 
non–farmers and non–agricultural activities having access to the central part of the CAP 
budget (Lowe and Ward, 1998a). 
 
The RDR is also significant in terms of the novel procedures it introduces into the CAP.  The 
arrangements for programming and implementing the RDR have been modelled on the 
operation of Structural Fund programmes, such as those under Objective 5b which promoted 
the development and diversification of fragile rural economies.  Each Member State is 
required to draw up territorially–based seven year Rural Development Plans “at the most 
appropriate geographical level” and for all areas of the EU.  The plans are intended to deliver 
a range of grant schemes, part-funded by the EU, in an integrated way that is responsive to the 
diverse needs and circumstances in individual countries and regions.  A broad menu of 
agricultural and rural development schemes is allowable but each country is obliged to have 
an agri-environment programme.  In drawing up the plans, Member States are required to 
consider economic, environmental and social impacts and to consult with interested parties.  
Thus the RDR imports into the core of the CAP a set of alternative management principles, 
including those of decentralisation, partnership, multi–annual programming and co–financing 
(Lowe and Ward, 1998a). 
 
Unfortunately, expenditure on the RDR is subject, in principle, to a freeze on spending until 
2006.  This contrasts with the situation following the 1992 reforms of the CAP when 
expenditure on agri–environment and the other accompanying measures was allowed to rise 
year on year in response to the take–up of relevant schemes by Member States (Buller, 2000).  
CAP expenditure on the rural development and accompanying measures is expected to reach 
Euro 4.38 billion in 2000, or around 10.5 per cent of the total budget.  By the year 2002, the 
proportion of the budget will have actually fallen to 9.9 per cent.   Even by 2006, rural 
development and the accompanying measures will still account for no more than 10.5 per cent 
of the CAP budget.  Even though both the RDR and the commodity supports are within the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section, decisions taken at the Berlin summit effectively segregate the 
expenditures on them, which will prevent any transfer of funding out of commodity support, 
even if savings are made in the latter.   
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The prospects for additional resources for environmental and rural development ends now 
depends on the ways in which Member States choose to use the discretionary possibilities that 
Agenda 2000 leaves open to them to reorient certain production–related payments: namely, 
through the re–use of monies recouped from the imposition of modulation and cross–
compliance conditions on commodity payments (Figure 3). 
 
Under the so–called horizontal regulation (1259/99), which applies to all the commodity 
regimes, Member States are required to define appropriate environmental conditions to attach 
to commodity payments to farmers, as well as proportionate penalties  through forfeiture of 
payments  for farmers who infringe these conditions.  Member States are also authorised to 
modulate direct payments per farm  i.e. to withhold from producers a proportion of their 
commodity payments.  The monies accrued from implementing either cross-compliance or 
modulation will remain available to the particular Member State to provide additional funding 
for certain measures under the RDR, namely agri–environmental programmes, LFA supports, 
early retirement and afforestation. The resources that may become available from penalising 
farmers for transgressing environmental cross–compliance conditions are likely to be neither 
significant nor consistent over time.  Modulation, though, could yield significant resources by 
withholding up to 20% of compensation payments to farmers.  In essence it is the only 
significant means available for Member States to switch support towards multi–functionality. 
 
Member States are allowed to apply modulation at their discretion using any one, or a 
combination, of criteria.  These are: when the labour force on a farm holding falls short of a 
nationally-determined minimum; when the overall prosperity of a holding (expressed as a 
standard gross margin corresponding to the average situation in a given region) exceeds limits 
decided by the Member State; or when the total quantity of aid given to a farm exceeds limits 
set by the Member State.  Three key variables therefore determine how modulation could 
work: the choice of criteria; the level of the ceiling (or ceilings) above which payment 
reductions should be applied, and the rates of reduction of payments beyond these ceilings.  
According to Falconer and Ward (2000), four approaches offer themselves as alternatives. 
 
The first is termed ‘universal modulation’ where all farm businesses would be subjected to 
the same percentage reduction in their compensation payments. Under the Regulation, this 
could be set at anything up to 20 per cent.  The second is termed ‘discriminatory modulation’ 
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where a ceiling would be applied, such that only producers enjoying higher payments or 
greater profitability, or employing fewer workers would find their payments reduced.  The 
ceiling could be set so that a specified  proportion of farm businesses (say, the largest 30 per 
cent) would be affected.  The third strategy is ‘progressive modulation’ where farm 
businesses receiving higher payments (or enjoying higher standard gross margins) would have 
greater proportions of their receipts modulated.  Finally, the progressive and discriminatory 
options could be combined to give a fourth strategy  ‘progressive discriminatory 
modulation’  where only farm businesses in receipt of payments over a certain ceiling 
would be modulated, and then at a graded, progressive rate according to how high the level of 
payment was above that ceiling.   In short, how the burden of modulation is distributed across 
the farming community  as well as the decision whether or not to modulate at all  is at the 
discretion of the Member State. 
 
The Berlin deal and the discretion to modulate compensation payments establish what may 
prove to be the key axis for debate and negotiations in the next round of CAP reform, 
expected between 2003 and 2006. A central question is likely to be about degressivity.   
Those Member States who choose to apply modulation will have already experimented with a 
form of degressivity and the recycling of a ‘rural dividend’ from such a measure.  The present 
juncture therefore raises important questions, not only about how Member States are 
positioning themselves in relation to these future debates, but also about the implications of 
implementing a more devolved approach to the CAP for the future coherence of this most 
‘European’ of policies.   
 
It is therefore useful now to turn to a comparative examination of French and British 
responses to the challenges and opportunities offered by the Agenda 2000 package.  France 
and Britain stand out from other EU Member States in the vigorous manner in which they 
have committed themselves to the active implementation of the RDR.  In doing so, both 
countries have decided to take up the opportunity under the Agenda 2000 package to 
modulate direct payments to farmers in order to make more money available.  They are the 
only two states to have decided to do this from the outset.  Not surprisingly, other Member 
States are keeping a close eye on what Britain and France are doing. 
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Applying the CAP’s Second Pillar in France and the UK 
 
Britain and France constitute an unlikely vanguard.  France, as a major net beneficiary of the 
CAP, has traditionally been a staunch defender of it and the leader of the protectionist wing 
(Gardner, 1996); whereas the UK, as a net contributor, has traditionally been antipathetic to 
the CAP and the leader of the liberalising wing.  They therefore make strange bedfellows in 
leading the implementation of the Second Pillar.  The confluence highlights the shifting 
politics around the CAP, and holds out the prospect of creating a significant coalition for 
progressive reform.  However, the extent of British and French concurrence should not be 
exaggerated.  After all, the UK was consistently critical of the Agenda 2000 proposals for not 
going far enough in cutting prices and production controls, and France was critical of them for 
going too far.  Where the two countries do agree is in seeing the present system of farm 
subsidies as politically unsustainable, and in wishing to see some form of degressivity applied 
to farmers’ compensation payments.  However, they differ in their reasons for pursuing this 
course and, in crucial details, over the way it should be done.   
 
The UK had long taken the view that compensation payments to farmers should be gradually 
reduced.  Indeed, it had proposed degressivity prior to the 1992 MacSharry reforms, in 
response to the Commission's proposal at the time to limit aid per producer through an EU–
wide ceiling on payments.  This ceiling would have had a disproportionate impact on UK 
producers, because of their larger average size, and on the UK share of the CAP budget 
(Allanson, 1991). The Commission resurrected the option in its Agenda 2000 proposals.  
Again, the UK response was to propose a gradual phasing out of compensatory payments over 
time.  As the likelihood of a freeze on CAP spending emerged, other Member States, 
including Sweden, Denmark and Italy, came around to this position.  In the final weeks of the 
Agenda 2000 negotiations, France too came out in support of degressivity (Ministère de 
l'Agriculture, Press Release 14 January 1999).  The French proposals, though, unlike the 
UK’s, were for a selective approach to degressivity, exempting smaller farmers, targeting high 
productivity sectors (cereal and oilseed growers) and insisting that a proportion of the savings 
be redirected towards “rural development and multifunctional agriculture” (Agra Europe 15 
January 1999, EP/6). 
 
Whereas degressivity is in keeping with the UK’s long–term liberalising stance towards the 
CAP, for France support for the measure was an expediency driven by two requirements.  
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First, the French Government wanted to counter the proposal of the German Government 
(who were holding the Presidency of the EU) that the budgetary pressures on the CAP should 
be relieved through a move to national co-financing of mainstream CAP payments.  To the 
French this was to be strenuously resisted as a quite unacceptable step towards the 
renationalisation of the CAP (Lemaître, 1999).  The second requirement was to free up 
resources within the CAP budget to pursue multifunctionality.  During the late 1990s, French 
officials and politicians had come around to the view that the CAP needed to be 
fundamentally re–oriented  if support for farmers was to remain publicly acceptable (Pisani, et 
al 1994; Le Pensec, 1998; Assemblée Nationale, 1998).  The basis of this reorientation is a 
new social contract between farmers and society enshrined in the new Loi d’Orientation 
Agricole (LOA).  This was adopted in July 1999 after long debate (Assemblée Nationale, 
1999) but it still needed to be funded. 
 
The LOA marked a turning point in French agricultural policy.  The farming community had 
demanded it to counter the growing sense of uncertainty that followed the 1992 CAP reforms 
and the steps taken then towards the liberalisation of agricultural trade.  The LOA can be seen 
as an attempt by the Socialist Government to establish a new basis for support for French 
agriculture in the face of WTO pressures and the possible renationalisation of the CAP.  
Article 1 of the new law states that agriculture must meet tripartite goals  economic, social 
and environmental  through its wise management of land and its contribution to rural 
development.  The assumption is that, to continue to be supported by society, agriculture must 
clearly demonstrate that it is meeting society’s contemporary needs.  The key instrument for 
the realisation of these goals are the new Contrats Territoriaux d'Exploitation (CTEs or land 
management agreements).  Through the CTEs farmers agree to do things which meet 
society’s priorities for rural areas and land management, and in return government agrees to 
support these actions (see below). 
 
Although the LOA was largely responding to a national policy agenda, it was also in step with 
the thinking that shaped the Agenda 2000 proposals.  Bertrand Hervieu, the rural sociologist 
and agricultural advisor to the French Socialists, who was the architect of the LOA, was a 
member of the Buckwell Group.  The LOA thus anticipated the introduction of the RDR but 
expressed a clearer vision for the future of agriculture than did the final and compromised 
version of Agenda 2000.  The failure to generate additional resources for the RDR at the EU 
level therefore presented a dilemma for the French government.  If it was to take forward its 
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ambitious new social contract with farmers and to show a lead in the renewal of the CAP, it 
was obliged to use the national discretion Agenda 2000 gave it, through modulation, to free 
up additional resources. 
 
The UK Government was under no such compulsion.  Its decision to take an equally vigorous 
role in the implementation of the RDR did not spring from any prior strategic stance.  Unlike 
for France, the decision was not the outcome of some grand plan or national debate about the 
future of agriculture and its place in British society.  Instead it was a tactical response taken in 
the wake of the Agenda 2000 agreement.  The one strategic consideration concerned 
degressivity.  It seemed clear to British officials and Ministers that CAP reform would have to 
be revisited within a few years, and that degressivity would be a key component of the next 
round.  Modulation offered an opportunity to ‘test drive’ degressivity, to show that the UK 
was really committed to this sort of approach, to demonstrate its feasibility and to promote a 
form of degressivity that would suit the UK. 
 
This interest in promoting degressivity for the next round of CAP reform on its own would 
probably not have been sufficient to propel the UK Government to take the momentous step 
that it eventually took.  Indeed, the eventual decision on modulation came as something of a 
surprise because earlier in 1999 the Agriculture Minister, Nick Brown, had declared himself 
“not an advocate of modulation”  (House of Commons Agriculture Committee 1999, para. 
114).  Other factors were important in the decision.  The Labour Government elected in 1997 
sought a more central and constructive role in the direction of the EU than its predecessors.  
With agriculture this has entailed moderating the position of former UK Governments of 
principled opposition to the CAP on free market grounds (see, for example, MAFF, 1995) 
towards a stance of progressive reform that counterposes greater market orientation for 
agricultural production with a positive agenda for the promotion of countryside management 
and rural development (Agricultural Advisory Group, 1999; Performance and Innovation 
Unit, 1999)  
 
Such a stance has been important for domestic political reasons too, not only to placate the 
influential conservation lobby but also as the Government has tried both to counter criticisms 
from an increasingly vocal rural lobby and to give a lead to the UK farming community 
locked in its deepest income crisis since the War. The Government had signalled an interest in 
modernising rural policy with the announcement of its intention to produce a Rural White 
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Paper, which saw publication in November 2000.  The Prime Minister’s new Performance and 
Innovation Unit in the Cabinet Office was also charged with the task of reviewing the 
rationale for government intervention in rural economies.  In the Agenda 2000 negotiations, 
therefore, the UK Government strongly supported the Second Pillar proposals and indeed 
sought to widen their coverage of countryside management and rural development issues.  
Indeed, in many respects, the Second Pillar idea seemed to embody many of the UK’s 
aspirations for a broader rural policy that might eventually supersede what was seen to be a 
discredited and outdated agricultural policy (Hanley et al, 1999). The Minister of Agriculture 
was eventually to proclaim that the RDR “represents the long-term future of public supports 
for farm businesses and the rural economy [and] a significant opportunity for improvement of 
the rural environment and the countryside” (Hansard 7 December 1999, Col. 703). 
 
The UK Government, though, faced a very specific difficulty if it was to implement the RDR 
with any vigour.  The allocation of future funding to Member States for the RDR following 
the Agenda 2000 agreement was largely based upon their historic spending on agri–
environment, agricultural structures and rural development measures.  However, the antipathy 
of previous UK Governments to the CAP meant that, over the years, there had been an 
unwillingness to spend significant amounts on such non–compulsory elements of the EAGGF.  
That unwillingness was reinforced by the fact that these elements required domestic match 
funding which was strenuously resisted by the UK Treasury1.  In consequence of its spending 
record, the UK was allocated only 3.5 per cent of the European RDR budget for 2000–2006 
(compared with 17.6 per cent for France).  That would have left the Government without 
funds for new or expanded measures under the Regulation, and at odds with a groundswell of 
support from rural interests expecting significant expansion in this field. 
 
                                                 
1This was not only because the Treasury saw match funding of CAP schemes as throwing good money 
after bad but also because of the much higher leverage of domestic funds required in the UK as a 
consequence of Britain’s special budget rebate under the Fontainebleau agreement.  In 1984 the UK, 
as a significant net contributor to the EU budget, negotiated a mechanism which means that it 
automatically gets back about two-thirds of the difference between what it contributes to, and what it 
receives from, the EU budget at the end of each year.  Any extra expenditure in Britain on EU 
programmes reduces the end-of-year rebate by two-thirds of that expenditure.  Furthermore, the EU 
budget money itself also contains a contribution from the UK of around 15 per cent.  The net effect is 
that the UK contribution to any additional EU funds spent in Britain is 72 per cent.  To schemes that 
are formally co-financed, say on a 50:50 basis (as with the accompanying measures), Member States 
also have to directly contribute, with the result that the effective UK contribution in this case is 86 per 
cent.  In other words, the Fontainebleau rebate arrangement means that the UK Treasury regards itself 
as having to allocate £6 to draw down £1 of non-UK money. 
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In December 1999, following representations from a wide range of organisations, the 
Agriculture Minister announced his intention to make use of the scope for modulation to 
greatly expand the funding for the implementation of the RDR.  He talked in terms of “a 
major switch of farm spending from production aids to support for the broader rural 
economy” which represented a “radical redirection of support” (MAFF, 1999a, p.1).  The 
modulated money had to be matched pound for pound by the UK Treasury involving even 
bigger resource allocations because of the Fontainebleau agreement.  This all flew in the face 
of conventional wisdom that no major additional public resources should be allocated to 
agriculture prior to a fundamental reform of the CAP that would include the dismantling of 
most of its price supports and direct payments.  It therefore marked a major departure for UK 
public policy.  It was a necessary step, though, if the UK was going to make anything at all of 
the potential of the new RDR.  The UK’s greater dependency in this regard on modulation 
than France’s can be seen by comparing the scale of the additional funds released for the 
RDR.  In France, modulation by 2 per cent in aggregate of direct CAP payments will increase 
the funds available for implementing the RDR in 2001 by about 20 per cent.  In the UK, in 
contrast, modulation starting at 2.5 per cent and rising to 4.5 per cent by 2006, with matched 
funding from the UK Treasury, will increase the total budget for the RDR by about 60 per 
cent in this period, including a doubling of the resources for agri-environment schemes in 
England.  (Even so, UK expenditure on the RDR will still be running at about one third of that 
in France).   In effect, given the absence of a reform dividend at the EU–level and the UK’s 
past disregard of discretionary CAP schemes, the UK Government has found no financial 
slack in the system when it has wanted to redirect support.  It has therefore had to dig deeper 
into the compulsory CAP payments and add more of its own domestic funds, in order to 
grease the process of reform.  
 
The UK and France have thus both embarked on a very active implementation of the RDR.  In 
doing so, however, they are pursuing distinctive national agendas, as becomes apparent when 
one examines further the approach each has adopted to modulation and the formulation of the 
Rural Development Plans that will implement the RDR. 
 
The Use of Modulation in France and the UK 
 
In pursuing modulation the French Government has sought to reinforce its new social contract 
with farmers.  A guiding principle has been to make the aid given to farmers more publicly 
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legitimate, not only in terms of what it supports but also in terms of its distribution.  At 
present (i.e. before modulation), 40 per cent of all aid goes to fewer than 10 per cent of French 
farms and these are the larger farms.  During the election campaign of 1997, the French 
Socialist Party promised to address public disquiet over the unequal distribution of CAP 
support, not least the large share going to the big cereal growers.  In government, therefore, it 
opted for a progressive and discriminatory approach to modulation (Ministère de l'Agriculture 
1999a)As such French modulation has a double objective, first to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of the use of public money to support farmers and second to achieve a more 
balanced agricultural policy that addresses a wider range of agricultural ‘functions’ than 
simply food production.  In the words of the French agricultural minister, modulation 
represents a “redistribution and a reorientation of agricultural support” (Glavany, 1999). 
 
Cuts will be based upon a complex combination of all three of the available criteria (as laid 
down in Regulation 1259/99) – the overall aid per farm, the labour force on the farm, and the 
farm’s prosperity (in terms of its gross margins).  The initial proposal was to apply only the 
first two criteria.  However, farmers’ organisations complained that sectors making a loss 
despite heavy subsidies would be particularly badly hit.  In response, the Government decided 
to include the gross margin measure also, to avoid penalising the least profitable farm 
businesses.  Modulation has been designed to ensure that the vast majority of French farmers 
are unaffected.  Farms receiving less than 30,000 Euros in direct aid or which have a standard 
gross margin of less than 50,000 Euros are excluded.  For farms that are above these 
thresholds a fixed base rate of 3 per cent modulation will apply, as well as a progressive 
variable rate depending upon the farm’s prosperity (going from 0 per cent for farms with a 
standard gross margin of 50,000 Euros and rising to 20 per cent for those having a standard 
gross margin of 150,000 Euros or more).  The amount due to be deducted will then be reduced 
in relation to the level of employment on the farm (including, through a complex system of 
weighting, both family members and employees, and full–time and part–time personnel) 
(Ministère de l’Agriculture, 2000a). 
 
Only one farm in eleven will be affected by modulation.  That is 57,000 farms, who, before 
modulation, receive around 41 per cent of all direct CAP payments in France.  Of these, some 
43,000 will see a drop in their direct payments of less than 5 per cent.  Only 1400 farms, 
mainly in the rich cereal regions of the north, will have their direct payments cut by the 
maximum 20 per cent (Chatellier, 2000). 
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Despite the fact that only a relatively small minority of farmers will be affected by modulation 
and that the majority will benefit indirectly from this redistribution, the scheme has proved 
highly contentious amongst the farming community.  The large–scale cereal producers are 
understandably opposed, and they argue that their international competitiveness will be 
severely weakened.  Other farmers are alarmed at the precedent that modulation will set:  they 
see CAP direct payments as rightfully theirs and regard modulation as simply a new tax on 
farming. 
 
Initially, during the Agenda 2000 negotiations, the main French agricultural union, the 
Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), which is often charged 
with being dominated by the interests of the larger producers, supported the principle of 
modulation.  It did this essentially for tactical reasons, to counter proposals to apply 
degressivity across the board which would have cut France’s returns from the CAP budget.  
Modulation, on the other hand, would leave to national discretion how to redistribute the 
existing national CAP allocation (FNSEA, 1999).  Once France took the lead in applying 
modulation, the FNSEA proceeded to dispute the modalities of its application to the point of 
submitting a formal complaint to the Conseil d'Etat (France’s supreme administrative court) in 
March 2000 (FNSEA, 2000).  The FNSEA has called the measure unjust and has repeatedly 
claimed that intermediate–size holdings, rather than the largest and richest, will bear the 
brunt, a viewpoint strongly contested by the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de 
l'Agriculture 1999b). 
 
In contrast, the Confédération Paysanne, the traditionally left-wing agricultural union, has 
been a staunch supporter of modulation, fully welcoming both its redistributive and its 
reorientation objectives (Confédération Paysanne, 1999).  Drawing much of its support from 
small livestock farmers and from the upland regions likely to benefit most from the transfer of 
funds that modulation represents, the Confédération Paysanne has called for a more radical 
shift, maintaining that, though welcome, modulation has not really challenged the dominant 
productivist model (Mouillet, 2000). 
 
While French modulation is overtly socially redistributive, refocusing support on small and 
medium sized farms  the traditional clientele of French agrarian policy  it is also 
indirectly redistributing support geographically. The process should favour areas which 
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currently receive relatively little by way of production support, transferring resources from 
agriculturally prosperous to marginal regions.   This dimension though has attracted much less 
attention, partly because it is an indirect effect rather than a deliberate intention.  Also the 
overall transfer of resources between regions will be very small (involving at the most less 
than 2 per cent of the CAP budget). Finally, the impact of such transfers is hidden within a 
single national Rural Development Plan. 
 
The UK approach to modulation contrasts sharply with that adopted by France (see Figure 4).  
In Britain universal modulation is to be applied from 2001, based on total direct payments 
received, beginning with a flat rate reduction of all direct payments of 2.5 per cent, rising 
gradually to 3.5 per cent in 2003 and 2004, and 4.5 per cent in 2005 and 2006. The decision to 
pursue universal modulation reflects a number of considerations. 
 
First, the UK Government had strenuously resisted the European Commission’s proposal to 
place an EU-wide ceiling on payments to producers as being unfair to Britain and to Britain’s 
larger farmers.  It would have seemed inconsistent  now that the decision was the UK 
Government’s to make and the modulated resources would stay in Britain  to pursue an 
approach to modulation that discriminated against larger producers. 
 
Another critical consideration was the international competitiveness of UK agriculture.  As 
MAFF explained “the Government remains opposed to any approach to modulation which 
would run counter to the need for our industry to become more efficient and better able to 
face the more competitive markets that are in prospect” (MAFF, 1999b, p.10). Likewise, the 
Minister, Nick Brown, told the House of Commons Agriculture Committee in May 1999 “My 
preference is that everybody be treated the same.  I am not in favour of discriminating against 
businesses because they are efficient” (1999, para. 113).2  Even so, MAFF’s analysis (1999c, 
pp12-15) of the projected impact on farm incomes of applying modulation implies relatively 
greater gains to cattle and sheep farms in comparison with cereal producers. 
 
                                                 
2
 The corollary that it is the farm businesses more heavily reliant on production subsidies that are the 
more efficient ones is clearly questionable.  The contrary argument was put by a government think 
tank, the Performance and Innovation Unit, which suggested that reducing compensation payments 
would actually help to remove market distortions and should stimulate the competitive pressures on 
farm businesses (PIU 1999, pp 92-5).  These different judgments depend upon whether a short-term or 
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An additional consideration in the UK context was administrative simplicity and efficiency.  
Of the possible options, universal modulation is the most straightforward and least 
bureaucratic to  implement.   If  all  compensation payments are simply reduced by a flat rate, 
this removes the need to calculate total receipts under the various compensation payment 
schemes received by individual farm businesses.  More complex arrangements would 
inevitably create loopholes for producers to reduce or avoid their modulation liability.  
 
Compared to France, the politics of modulation were relatively easier to negotiate for the UK 
Government.  The application of modulation at a universal but modest rate was necessary to 
avoid the outright opposition of the National Farmers’ Union and the Country Landowners’ 
Association.  In Britain CAP compensation payments are seen as production subsidies and 
lack public legitimacy.  Farming leaders prefer not to draw attention to them, and would have 
found it hard to sustain an argument that modulation represented a tax on farmers' incomes. 
The Country Landowners’ Association had even put forward its own proposals to divert 
production payments into conservation and diversification schemes (Country Landowners’ 
Association 1995).  In July 1999, though, the Policy Committee of the National Farmers’ 
Union rejected giving its backing to the use of the modulation option in Britain (National 
Farmers Union, 1999).  This decision, however, came after a sizeable majority (77 per cent) 
of the 17,000 farmers that responded to a MAFF consultation exercise had expressed support 
for a ceiling of some sorts on direct payments (MAFF, 1999b).   
 
The decision to modulate was enthusiastically welcomed by countryside and conservation 
organisations who had pressed for energetic implementation of the RDR (see, for example, 
Council for the Protection for Rural England, 1999a; English Nature et al., 1999). The 
Council for the Protection for Rural England (CPRE) called the announcement a 
“breakthrough” that was “terrific news for both the countryside and the farmers who have 
been turned away from ‘green’ farming schemes because of a shortage of funds” (CPRE, 
1999b, p.1).  Baroness Young, Chair of English Nature, proclaimed “this remarkable and 
historic deal” to be “the most important decision on the countryside for 20 years and the 
biggest cash injection into saving our wildlife ever”  (English Nature, 1999, p.1).  The 
Countryside Alliance also welcomed the additional resources for agri-environment 
programmes as “long overdue” (Countryside Alliance, 1999, p.1). 
                                                                                                                                                        
a medium to long-term perspective is taken of competitiveness.  In the midst of a farm income crisis it 
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The greatest political difficulty was in securing Scottish and particularly Welsh support for 
the move.  A common approach across the UK was seen as necessary for the sake of political 
consistency and to avoid legal challenges from farmers claiming to have been unfairly 
disadvantaged.  In Scotland and Wales, though, there is more public and political sympathy 
for assistance to farmers  especially the smaller and remoter ones  on social grounds.  
Support for modulation was therefore comparatively weaker than in England, but the sums to 
be yielded will be much less significant.  The decision to apply the measure appeared to some 
in Scotland and Wales as a response primarily to a set of English concerns about agricultural 
policy reform, which was then imposed on the rest of the UK. 
 
The French and British Rural Development Plans  
 
Member States have had to draw up Rural Development Plans, initially for the period 2000-
2006, to show how they intend to implement the RDR.  The Regulation, published in May 
1999, set a very tight timetable requiring Member States to submit their draft plans by 1 
January 2000 and the European Commission and Council to complete the process of plan 
approval within six months.  The plans may be prepared at either national or regional level.  
They have to include an assessment of rural needs and priorities and a justification of which 
RDR aids will be offered. 
 
In France a single Plan de Développement Rural National has been prepared (Ministère de 
l’Agriculture, 2000b).  It will be possible for farmers to seek aid under a number of national 
and more local programmes, many of which have been established in France under previous 
legislation.  Nevertheless, the RDR has been a catalyst in launching a new rural development 
process at the national level which has established a set of six priorities around which new 
and existing measures have been combined into major implementing programmes, as follows: 
 
• the promotion of sustainable, multifunctional agriculture, for which the main instrument is 
the CTE (which will take around 35% of the total RDP budget); 
• the occupation of the territory by farmers and foresters, to help manage the process of 
structural change in rural land management and to support marginal areas in danger of 
abandonment (36 per cent of the budget); 
                                                                                                                                                        
is perhaps not surprising that a short-term perspective held sway with Ministers. 
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• to encourage value-added primary production in rural areas (23% of the budget); 
• to maintain forest resources (3 per cent of the budget); 
• to meet ecological requirements  particularly France’s obligations with regard to Natura 
2000 sites (2 per cent of the budget); 
• training of farmers and foresters (1 per cent of the budget). 
 
Within this single national plan there remains a great deal of scope for a decentralised pattern 
of implementation.  For example, although the CTE programme is nationally available, it does 
nevertheless provide for the locally differentiated application of the range of available 
measures (Ministère de l'Agriculture 1998).  At the Département (County) level, officials, 
farming leaders and environmental bodies agree a standard contract menu addressing the 
economic and environmental needs of the area, which sets the parameters within which 
farmers may negotiate their individual CTEs.  These local contract menus reflect the different 
production systems and landscape types in an approach (based on the notion of ‘pays’) which 
seeks to strengthen territorial distinctiveness as well as sustainable land management.  The 
overall approach, of a single national architecture and sub-national flexibility of 
implementation, is in keeping with other French aid schemes (such as Regulation 2078/92, see 
Buller and Brives, 2000) and reflects the requirement of a centralised administrative structure 
for a coherent national framework responsive to the country’s considerable territorial 
diversity. 
 
In the UK, separate Rural Development Plans were prepared for England, Scotland and 
Wales.  Each plan includes a country overview and the range of measures to be implemented 
throughout the plan area, plus descriptions of needs and specific measures applicable at a 
more local level.  In Wales and Scotland there is a divide between areas according to their 
eligibility for Objective 1 funding.  In England, the Plan contains regional chapters based 
upon the Government Office regions (MAFF, 2000).  This represents a significant departure.  
MAFF’s regional administration within England had been separate, and had had different 
boundaries, from the Regional Government Offices structure, through which other central 
Ministries co-ordinated their regional presence and implementation programmes.  The novel 
basis of the regional chapters of the England RDP in fact anticipated the realignment of 
MAFF’s regional administration and its incorporation into the Government Offices  a move 
advocated for some time but previously resisted by the Ministry (UK Round Table on 
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Sustainable Development, 1998: Performance and Innovation, Unit 1999).  In this way the 
UK approach to implementing the RDR articulates with the administrative restructuring 
accompanying devolution and decentralisation which, in turn, facilitates the integration of 
agricultural administration into other sub-national structures concerned with territorial and 
regional governance. The transition from a sectoral to a territorial orientation within the CAP 
thus coincides with a thrust towards devolution within the UK which has triggered major 
debates about the role and future of agriculture and the countryside in regional economies, 
identities and governance structures (Lowe and Ward, 1998b).   
 
France and the UK are thus coping quite differently with national rural diversity and the 
opportunities for decentralisation within Agenda 2000 (Figure 5).  In France it is being done 
in such a way that agricultural policy making remains squarely a national political enterprise 
and a central function of the French State (Hervieu and Viard, 2001).  In Britain it is being 
done in a way that is ceding significant decision making to the regions: with regional 
partnerships and consultative fora overseeing the implementation of the plans, bringing 
together public sector bodies, countryside agencies, farming organisations and conservation 
groups.  In emphasising different priorities for agriculture and rural development in separate 
regional contexts, the process is giving a focus to the notions of a distinctively Scottish or 
Welsh agriculture or even a South West of England agriculture.  This is eroding the notion of 
agriculture as a national economic sector and is aligning regional agricultures with already 
existing tendencies and structures that are leading to a differentiated countryside (Marsden et 
al., 1993).    While this regionalisation process is giving quite new attention to the state of the 
farming industry and farming communities at the regional level it is also fuelling debates 
about the contribution of agriculture to emerging regional objectives, such as for rural 
development, local supply chains, regional competitiveness, countryside character and 
regional sustainability. 
 
These different priorities are reflected to a certain extent in the separate Rural Development 
Plans for Britain.  The Scottish Plan, for example, has a strong social focus and puts a special 
emphasis on the need to secure and maintain farm viability.  The Welsh Plan presents an 
integrated set of goals for Welsh farming, and proposes using investment aids to promote the 
environmental and economic restructuring of farm holdings.  The English Plan has the 
strongest regional differentiation of rural needs and opportunities and emphasises the creation 
of a productive and sustainable rural economy. 
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Environmental management, countryside conservation and the protection of natural resources 
are critical issues addressed by all the British Plans.  The Welsh Plan comes closest to the 
French one in putting forward a set of integrated themes and measures.  In contrast, the 
Scottish and English Plans simply describe how each RDR measure will or will not be 
implemented.  Agri-environmental measures and Less Favoured Areas take by far the largest 
share of budget allocations in the three British Plans.  Compared with the French Plan, much 
less emphasis is placed on farm investment (Figure 6).  Certain eligible measures have also 
been omitted from the British Plans, most notably support for early retirement from farming 
and to help young farmers setting up in business. 
 
Both Britain and France have used the Rural Development Regulation to launch new rural 
policy initiatives and instruments, but these are very different in form, content and 
implications.  The English Rural Enterprise Scheme is a broad and flexible development 
scheme that provides project-based support for farming and non-farming activities in rural 
areas.  It draws on the range of measures under the novel Article 33 of the RDR (see Figure 
2).  The objective of the Scheme is to assist rural communities in “their regeneration and 
adjustment to the declining importance of agriculture and other primary industries and to the 
new demands of the rural economy” (MAFF, 2000).  The resources available are limited  
rising to about 15 per cent of the allocated funding by 2004/5  and will partly be targeted at 
Objective 2 areas suffering from problems of agricultural decline.  Even so, the Scheme 
should set important precedents for what the CAP can support, drawing in the sorts of non-
agricultural activities that have conventionally been regarded as constituting rural 
development in the UK, such as improving rural services and infrastructure and encouraging 
tourism and craft activities. 
 
The French Contrats Territoriaux d'Exploitation (CTE), which are the centre-piece and 
principal policy mechanism of the French Rural Development Plan, are altogether different. 
They are voluntary farm management contracts designed to bring together into a single 
package a series of pre–existing and new aid schemes under the triple objective of 
maintaining and improving the economic, social and environmental contribution of farming to 
rural areas (Ministère de l'Agriculture, 1999c). They account for around 35% of the total 
budget allocated to implementing the RDR. 
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The CTEs were introduced by the 1999 Act as a means of promoting and funding agricultural 
multifunctionality, and in reorienting agricultural policy towards a broader rural agenda 
(Hervieu, 1999).  They build upon the experience of the agri–environmental measures 
following Regulation 2078/92, not only in incorporating environmental objectives into 
agricultural management practices but also in using the 'contract' as a means of engaging 
farmers (Buller and Brives, 2000). The CTEs add a farm investment component and other 
elements.   The Plans de Développement Durable (PDD) were a precursor.  Pursued on an 
experimental basis, these were whole farm contracts designed to integrate environmental and 
productive objectives into a single management plan (Charvet et al. 1998).  
 
The majority of CTE contracts are territorially or farm–system specific and are designed 
locally by groups of actors including the farming profession, environmental interests, local 
government and local economic actors through the Commission Départementale d'Orientation 
Agricole (CDOA). This bottom-up approach proved very successful with agri–environmental 
schemes under Regulation 2078/92 (Alphandéry and Bourliaud, 1996).  
 
The CTE, though, are more firmly anchored in the notion of territory, in recognition of the 
need to achieve a more coherent pattern of contracting than was the case with the former agri–
environmental measures. As a result, many different CTE types have been drawn up at the 
local level, reflecting particular production systems and/or landscape types. These have a 
wider brief that goes beyond the definition of environmentally friendly farm management 
practices to include rural employment generation and rural development (Le Goffe et al, 
1999).  
 
Some observers suggest that the CTEs might be a model for future EU agricultural policy, 
embodying the objectives of multifunctionality and legitimising agricultural support to both 
the wider population and external trading partners. The European Commission, though, was at 
first critical of what was perceived to be an extremely fragmented policy instrument lacking 
overall coherence.  There have also been some initial difficulties in implementing the 
measure.  By the end of 2000, fewer than 10% of the projected 20,000 CTEs for that year had 
been completed, and some regional officials charged with implementing the CTE were 
working to rule.  It is too early to say whether these difficulties are simply teething problems 
or point to more fundamental shortcomings, say, to do with the administrative complexity of 
the CTE scheme or the inability of farmers to grasp its overall rationale. 
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Conclusions  
 
Since its inception in the late 1960s, the CAP has proved to be a curious hybrid (Gray, 2000). 
Constructed at a time when national agricultural policies and strategies were being 
consolidated, the CAP has become the supra–national policy par excellence within the EU.  It 
has undoubtedly brought national agricultural development strategies under a single all–
embracing dynamic, that of increased productivity and intensification, farm holding 
restructuring and market intervention. Yet the paradox of the CAP is that, in creating a 
European agricultural bloc, it has strengthened the place of agriculture in national politics 
often out of all proportion with the sector’s economic importance.  The shift in decision-
making to Brussels provided national agricultural policy actors with a focal point for their 
lobbying and representations and, in so doing, fostered the emergence of cohesive and 
centralised national policy communities.  One consequence is a marked lack of internal 
decentralisation in agricultural policy making in EU Member States.  
 
Now this process is being put into reverse.  Already, under the 1992 reforms both agri-
environmental policy and Objective 5b had permitted a degree of sub-national variation in 
agricultural policy as well as the involvement of non-farming groups in decision making.  The 
Agenda 2000 reform takes this much further forward in devolving key policy competencies 
and responsibilities from EU institutions to individual Member States and allowing for 
significant internal decentralisation of policy implementation.  Crucially, this permissive 
decentralisation involves both the ‘pillars’ of the CAP, including a redirection of a proportion 
of the commodity supports and the expansion of other forms of support, for rural development 
and agri-environment. 
 
The British and French Governments are making the most of the discretion thus opened to 
them.  They are the only Member States to have taken up the modulation option from the 
start.  This has allowed both to pursue a vigorous approach to the Rural Development 
Regulation.  That Regulation gives Member States considerable freedom of choice in the 
specific measures to be adopted and the mechanisms to be used for achieving sustainable rural 
development.  Unfortunately, in most countries the absence of new resources has curbed the 
potential of the RDR to catalyse changes in domestic procedures and priorities.  By 
comparison, both the UK and France have responded positively and in an innovative manner 
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to this opportunity, and in doing so have significantly increased the role of sub-national actors 
in influencing the implementation of policy. 
 
The modalities and mechanisms of contemporary European agricultural policy are thus 
changing and three new aspects are apparent.  The first concerns subsidiarity and the 
increasing decentralisation of agricultural policy within the European Union which could 
challenge the classic post–war model of national farming operating within a strong supra–
national policy framework.  The second concerns multifunctionality by which agriculture is 
now being more actively encouraged to play a variety of roles within rural spaces and within 
the rural economy thereby challenging the classic sectoral vision of farming as an exclusively 
productive enterprise.  The third concerns territoriality by which we mean the increasing 
emphasis being placed (partly through the pursuit of the notions of multifunctionality and 
subsidiarity) on the role of contemporary agriculture in the constitution, representation and 
differentiation of rural space. 
 
Collectively, and eventually, these three new aspects may spell the end of a common and 
unified EU agricultural policy.  The external forces of increasing liberalisation and European 
expansion towards the East call into question the durability of the existing model of European 
farm support.  At the same time, internal forces call for a greater differentiation not only of 
aid schemes but also of rural territories.  The result is that the CAP may evolve into a broad 
regulatory framework within which Member States can operate an increasing range of 
discretionary support measures.  Moreover, these measures will focus less upon the 
productive function of farming and more on its function as a source of public goods including 
agricultural landscape maintenance, employment provision and sustainable rural economies.  
 
In this way, the counterpart to the decentralisation of the CAP is the Europeanisation of rural 
policy.  This is the implication in establishing the Rural Development Regulation as the 
second pillar of the CAP.  The fact that Member States are able to draw up their own 
programmes from a menu of measures means that what constitutes rural development still has 
the scope to vary, within this new framework, as the contrast between Britain and France 
illustrates. 
 
Indeed, the French and British cases are, to an extent, exemplary: with alternative objectives 
for modulation, one redistributive, the other degressive; and alternative conceptualisations of 
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the place of farming in the broader countryside, one central and definitive, the other more 
pluralist and differentiated. Ultimately, we discern two distinct rural agendas lying behind the 
French and British responses to the Agenda 2000 reforms (Figure 7).   
 
Responding essentially to an ‘agrarian agenda’, French rural policy continues to be focused 
upon agriculture as providing the central dynamic not only for the rural economy but also for 
rural society and the rural environment. Modulation, in liberating money for the CTE, and the 
CTEs themselves are aimed at maintaining farming activities and the agricultural working 
population on the land.  They entrench farm structures policy at the core of French rural 
policy.  Secondary knock–on effects to rural areas are anticipated through the reinforcement 
of local production systems and the underpinning of rural communities and services. The 
CTEs are concerned with reorienting agricultural policy to permit a degree of ecological 
modernisation and green re–coupling around the notion of agricultural multifunctionality.   
While this extends the remit of agricultural policy, its concerns remain firmly rooted in the 
maintenance of the ‘Farm France’. 
 
In contrast, the British response, reflecting the less agriculturally dependent nature of the 
British countryside is, to put it in simple terms, more specifically rural and less specifically 
agricultural.  The social justification both of modulation and of the various measures under 
Article 33 of the RDR is not so much agricultural survival as the provision of broader 
environmental public goods for a society that places particular value upon them.  Similarly, 
farming's long-term role is that of developing and responding to particular market 
opportunities resulting from shifting social demands on the countryside (quality food, regional 
food chains, farm tourism and countryside management).  Whereas the French plan reinforces 
the notion of an agriculturally-dependent rural economy, the British plans look to a diverse 
rural economy to provide crucial additional or alternative income sources to farm families.  
Ultimately, the British agenda is a countryside one rather than an agricultural one, a response 
to an increasingly differentiated rural space in which farmers are one set of economic, social 
and environmental actors amongst others. 
 
The divergence between national agendas should not be a matter of concern.  It reflects 
longstanding differences in national perspectives on rurality (Buller and Lowe, 1990; Lowe 
and Buller, 1990).  As policy seeks to reintegrate sectors of agriculture into the rural economy 
and environment it is important that it be sensitively articulated with the different rural 
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circumstances and conditions found at the national level and below.  Increasingly, the 
challenge for policy is how, within a basic framework of agreed rules, resource distribution 
and monitoring, to incorporate as much regional and local flexibility and discretion as 
possible.  To this end, Britain and France are experimenting with different means to adapt 
implementation structures to the requirements of territorial differentiation and integration.  
The lessons should be of interest to other Member States. 
 
The French approach relies on a new, ‘all-purpose’ instrument  the CTE.  The British 
approach is through the decentralisation and devolution of policy implementation.  Each 
approach has its own promise and potential pitfalls.  The CTE is a far-sighted and elegantly 
conceived measure that seeks to accommodate the diverse and territorially variable public 
demands on contemporary agriculture in one highly articulated instrument.  The promise is a 
new and more legitimate, social contract for French farmers (Confédération Paysanne, 2001).  
The potential pitfalls are that the measure falls victim to overly convoluted and prescriptive 
procedures with high transaction costs and that the underlying principles are obscured to both 
the farmers and the wider public.   
 
While agricultural and rural policy thus remain a central function of the French state, the 
British are experimenting with devolved structures of implementation in keeping with New 
Labour’s wider governmental reforms.  Moreover, reforms to agricultural and rural policy 
institutions in Britain have to be seen in the context of its recent experience with 
agriculturally-generated catastrophes such as BSE and, more recently, Foot and Mouth 
disease.  In effect, Britain is Europe’s first ‘post-BSE state’.  These embarrassing sagas have 
led to a far greater preparedness amongst the British polity to tackle the state structures 
around agrarian corporatism and to radically reform agricultural institutions and a greater 
willingness3. 
 
The promise of the new British approach to the CAP is to deliver territorially differentiated 
and integrated policies through the breaking down of the centralised agricultural state.  The 
potential pitfalls are that the central government concedes too little real decision-making 
                                                 
3
 This point is also echoed in the recent establishment, after the 2001 General Election, of a new 
Whitehall Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, to replace the former Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.  This reform means that for the first time since the establishment of 
the Board of Agriculture in 1889 there is now no UK central government department with the word 
‘agriculture’ in its title. 
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autonomy to the country and regional levels and, conversely, that regional officials and 
governance structures prove unequal to the task of pursuing effective and distinctive regional 
agricultural and rural policies. 
 
Although clearly pursuing divergent domestic agendas, the British and French Governments 
are converging in their strategies towards CAP reform at the European level.  They both see 
the present system of compensation payments as politically unsustainable, both look to a 
significant expansion of resources for the Rural Development Regulation and both are 
strongly in favour of applying degressivity to compensation payments.  There has been 
continuing liaison between the two Governments on these matters.  As we have said, the two 
make strange bedfellows, but, coming from opposite wings of the traditional divide between 
liberalisers and protectionists, they may yet form the core of a new coalition for progressive 
reform of the CAP. 
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Figure 1  - New Scope for National Discretion under Agenda 2000 
 
 
The First Pillar 
 
• opportunities to apply environmental conditions where direct commodity payments are 
made 
 
• national discretion in the application of a proportion of direct payments (the national 
envelope) to the beef sector (and eventually the dairy sector) 
 
• national discretion to modulate the total CAP direct payments for individual farmers in 
order to increase expenditure on the second pillar 
 
The Second Pillar 
 
• The new framework of the Rural Development Regulation and its opportunities to 
promote the integrated and decentralised planning of agri–environmental, agricultural 
and rural development measures 
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Figure 2 - Article 33 Measures under the Rural Development Regulation 
 
 
• land improvement 
• land reparcelling 
• setting up of farm relief and farm management services 
• marketing of quality agricultural products 
• basic services for the rural economy 
• renovation and development of villages, protection and conservation of the rural 
heritage 
• diversification of agricultural activities and activities close to agriculture, to provide 
multiple activities or alternative incomes 
• agricultural water resources management 
• development and improvement of infrastructure connected with the development of 
agriculture 
• encouragement for tourist and craft activities 
• protection of the environment in connection with agriculture, forestry and landscape 
conservation as well as with the improvement of animal welfare 
• restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and 
introducing appropriate prevention instruments 
• financial engineering 
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Figure 3  The Changed Architecture of the CAP 
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Figure 4 - The Implementation of Modulation in Britain and France 
 
 UK France 
Approach Universal modulation Progressive, 
discriminatory 
modulation 
Farms targeted All farms Largest 10% 
Basis of targeting Total payments received Combination of total 
payments received, 
standard gross margin, 
and number of 
employees 
Rate of modulation 2.5%, rising over time to 4.5% 0% – 20% 
Use of modulated 
funds 
Major increase in resources for 
agri–environment schemes 
Fund the CTE 
agreements 
Domestic rationale Recycling production subsidies 
to support countryside 
management 
Redistribution of support 
in pursuit of farm 
structures policy 
Wider strategy Degressivity of CAP payments 
to farmers 
Establishing CAP 
payments on a more 
legitimate basis 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Mechanisms for implementing the Rural Development Regulation in 
Britain and France 
 
 UK France 
Geographical Scale Devolved Rural 
Development Plans 
National Rural Development 
Plan 
Novel Mechanisms Rural Enterprise Scheme in 
England 
Contrats Territoriaux 
d'Exploitation 
Beneficiaries Farmers and other rural 
actors 
Farmers 
 
   
 38 
 
Figure 6 - Distribution (%) of the Budgets allocated to the French and the 
English Rural Development Plans, by measure, 2000-2006 
 
 French RDP English RDP 
Investment in agricultural holdings 10.2 0.3 
Installing young farmers 14.0 - 
Less Favoured Areas 19.3 12.0 
Early retirement 2.7 - 
Agri-environmental measures 28.5 65.2 
Improving the processing and marketing of 
agricultural products 
17.0 2.6 
Afforestation of agricultural land 0.8 5.0 
Other forestry measures 3.6 4.0 
Article 33 measures 
- Land improvement 
- Land re-organisation 
- Farm management support 
- Commercialisation of quality farm products 
- Services for the rural population and 
economy 
- Village renovation and heritage protection 
- Farm diversification 
- Management and protection of water used in 
farming 
- Agricultural infrastructural development 
- Promotion of rural tourism and crafts 
- Environmental protection 
- Reconstituting agricultural protection 
following natural disasters 
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Sources: Ministère de l’Agriculture, 2000; MAFF, 2000.  
 
   
 39 
Figure 7 -  Contemporary French and British rural agendas 
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